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Abstract
The well-established memory bias for arousing-negative stimuli seems to be enhanced in high trait-anxious persons and
persons suffering from anxiety disorders. We monitored the emergence and development of such a bias during and after
learning, in high and low trait anxious participants. A word-learning paradigm was applied, consisting of spoken
pseudowords paired either with arousing-negative or neutral pictures. Learning performance during training evidenced a
short-lived advantage for arousing-negative associated words, which was not present at the end of training. Cued recall and
valence ratings revealed a memory bias for pseudowords that had been paired with arousing-negative pictures,
immediately after learning and two weeks later. This held even for items that were not explicitly remembered. High anxious
individuals evidenced a stronger memory bias in the cued-recall test, and their ratings were also more negative overall
compared to low anxious persons. Both effects were evident, even when explicit recall was controlled for. Regarding the
memory bias in anxiety prone persons, explicit memory seems to play a more crucial role than implicit memory. The study
stresses the need for several time points of bias measurement during the course of learning and retrieval, as well as the
employment of different measures for learning success.
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Introduction
A hallmark finding in emotion research is that emotional items
receive preferential processing. This has been evidenced by
behavioral and neurophysiological methods for emotional scenes
and faces (e.g. [1–3]), but also for symbolic stimuli such as words
and gestures ([4–8], for review see [9], [10,11]). Moreover,
emotional items evoke a memory bias, with better performance for
emotional than for neutral stimuli. This is independent of stimulus
type, and was demonstrated for emotional pictures and scenes (e.g.
[12–14]), for film clips (e.g. [15]), stories (e.g. [16]) and again, also
for words (e.g. [17,6,10]).
Interestingly, this bias in the processing of, and memory for,
emotional (in particular, arousing-negative) stimuli is more
strongly expressed in persons suffering from anxiety disorders
(e.g. [18–21]) or in persons with a subclinical anxious personality
[22–25]. People with high levels of trait anxiety do not necessarily
meet the diagnostic criteria for an anxiety disorder, but are
particularly prone to develop one (e.g. [23,26,25,27]). It is
generally assumed that the differences in processing and learning
of emotional stimuli, in combination with environmental and
genetic predispositions, constitute the basis for the development of
anxiety disorders (e.g. [28]). Thus, to understand these disorders
and to develop effective psychotherapeutic treatments, it is
essential to understand how emotionally arousing and negative
stimuli and situations are processed and learned.
This is why the current study investigates the emergence of
memory bias for stimuli with a recently acquired arousing-negative
connotation (called ‘‘arousing-negative words’’ in the following) in
high and low trait anxious persons. Learning involved the pairing
of novel, word-like stimuli (pseudowords such as ‘‘muxo’’ or
‘‘binu’’) with arousing-negative or neutral pictures. The develop-
ment of the bias is monitored during learning, immediately after
learning and in a follow-up two weeks later with several measures
for memory performance.
How is a memory bias for emotional items best assessed? Most
studies investigate this bias immediately after a learning phase, and
only few studies focus on the consolidation phase after learning.
During consolidation, initial memory traces are stabilized, and
newly acquired memory traces are integrated into existing cortical
and subcortical memory networks ([29–32]). Experimental studies,
both with animals and humans, provide evidence that time and
sleep play important roles in memory consolidation (e.g. [33–42]).
Experimental evidence on differential consolidation for emotional
and neutral word-stimuli comes from Sharot and Phelps [43] who
assessed the recognition of existing words immediately and
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24 hours after peripheral, unattended presentation. While recog-
nition for neutral words deteriorated over time, performance for
negative words remained stable. Hu, Stylos-Allan and Walker [44]
stressed the importance of sleep for the superior consolidation of
emotional over neutral items.
When measuring memory performance, a major distinction is
drawn between explicit and implicit memory. Explicit or
declarative memory is knowledge that can be consciously accessed,
involving personal and world knowledge, such as trying to recall
someone’s name. In experimental learning contexts, it is most
often measured by asking the participant to freely recall or
recognize items from an earlier learned list. In contrast, implicit or
non-declarative memory refers to memory that cannot be
consciously accessed. Implicit memory is often measured indirect-
ly, for example by word-fragment completion [45]. It has often
been argued that implicit and explicit knowledge are distinct from
each other, going along with distinct biological correlates [46–50].
On the whole, a memory bias for emotional stimuli was shown
more often with explicit than implicit memory measures. Evidence
for the existence of an explicit memory bias for emotional stimuli
in persons with high trait anxiety comes from Eysenck and Byrne
[45], Russo and colleagues [25], as well as from a meta-analytic
review by Mitte [26], who analyzed data from implicit and explicit
tests separately. Mitte concluded that anxiety had an impact on
some explicit measures such as free recall, but not on other explicit
measures such as recognition. Evidence for the existence of an
implicit memory bias is thus less clear. It has been suggested in
persons with high levels of anxiety by Eysenck and Byrne [45],
Williams, Mathews and MacLeod [51] as well as by Williams,
Watts, MacLeod and Mathews [52,53], but could not be
replicated by others [23,54]. Given such heterogeneous findings,
it remains unclear under which circumstances an implicit memory
bias may exist.
Taken together, there is evidence for the existence of a memory
bias on the explicit recall of emotional stimulus material (in
particular for individuals high in (subclinical) anxiety), while
evidence for an implicit bias is less clear. Despite the large body of
literature on the topic, we are confident that we can add to this
field by addressing the following issues. First, we measure (the
emergence of) bias for neutral stimuli that gain their emotional
connotation through learning. We thus avoid stimuli that already
possess a particular valence (e.g. the word ‘‘shark’’, or a picture of
a shark) that was acquired during the participants’ lifetime, or may
even be innate. It is obviously impossible to have control over the
emotional content of such stimuli. By using initially neutral stimuli
– meaningless pseudowords - we aim at a better control of learning
histories, learning strategies and depth of encoding. Second, we
perform follow-up assessments with memory- and valence-related
measures, to target consolidation processes. Until now, recognition
or recall performance was most often measured immediately after
the relevant task, although there is strong evidence for memory-
enhancing effects at later post-training stages (cf. [55]). Third, we
believe that an on-line measurement already during learning can
considerably add to our understanding of the temporal charac-
teristics of biased memories. To learn more about the development
of the memory biases it is, in our view, necessary to meet these
concerns.
We thus investigated memory biases in a situation where the
negative valence of stimuli was acquired under controlled
conditions. Using an associative statistical learning paradigm
[56,57], neutral pseudoword stimuli were associated with pictures
denoting either arousing-negative or neutral concepts, to observe
the emergence of potential biases during the time course of
learning. Different from other applications, learning was done in a
single session, not on consecutive days. The statistical word-
learning paradigm is characterized by an increased conjoint
probability of two events (‘‘correct’’ pairings) over the time course
of learning, compared to two events with random contingency
(‘‘incorrect’’ pairings). The learner extracts relevant cues from the
information stream, without receiving feedback and usually
without conscious awareness of the underlying learning principle.
By repetitively presenting combinations of critical stimuli, long-
term learning becomes possible. Many repetitions lead to stronger
associations between stimuli, resulting in a typical learning curve.
The neural basis most likely consists of Hebbian cell assemblies,
which become connected to sustain language processing [58].
The associative statistical word-learning paradigm is taken as a
model for language-acquisition in children and adults (cf. [59,60]),
and offers some ecological validity. The paradigm is similar to
Evaluative Conditioning (EC) but differs in some aspects. EC is a
form of classical conditioning where the (dis)liking of a once
neutral stimulus is acquired through associative transfer of valence
from a paired (dis)liked stimulus [61]. An exemplary EC-paradigm
could be as follows: a neutral stimulus such as a pseudoword
(conditioned stimulus; CS) is repeatedly paired with a liked or
disliked, positive or negative arousing picture (unconditioned
stimulus; US). As a consequence, the previously neutral pseudo-
word shifts in valence towards the valence of the picture it was
presented with [62]. In contrast to the statistical word learning that
was applied in this study, the CS in EC-paradigms is paired with
more than one emotionally arousing US, which makes EC less
suitable for study designs aiming at a one-to-one mapping between
concept (and specific valence) and word form. Further differences
are that EC is shown to be completely independent of contingency
awareness of the CS-US pairing (e.g. [63]), resistant to extinction
and long lasting even up to a two months follow-up [64]. Statistical
learning, similar to evaluative conditioning, does not rely on – but
also does not exclude - the learner’s awareness of the presented
associations, and can be regarded as a form of associative learning
[63,65–68].
Equal groups of participants, either high or low in trait-anxiety,
were tested. To measure potentially biased memories, we applied a
cued-recall test and a valence rating. The recall test, a translation
task, explicitly tested the newly acquired meaning of the pseudo-
words. The valence ratings entailed a spontaneous evaluation of
the pseudowords’ valence, used to assess the transfer of valence
from the emotionally arousing pictures to the originally neutral
pseudowords. This rating was considered to tap into implicit
memory for the pseudowords’ meaning, especially when explicitly
remembered items were removed from the data. The valence
feature is considered to be part of its semantic representation (e.g.
[8]) and therefore marks a step in the acquisition of the words’
meaning. Note that others have also used valence ratings to
investigate implicit memory processes after only few learning
instances (e.g. [69]).
Given the current literature, we expected enhanced memory
effects for aversive material during learning, directly after the
training, and a potentiation of this bias after an additional time
delay that allows for consolidation. We expected more pronounced
effects in persons with high levels of anxiety, particularly in the
explicit measurements. The tests were carried out before, directly
after and two weeks after the training. If consolidation has a
differential impact on the bias development in high and low-
anxiety groups, differences between the two groups should
increase with time.
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Methods
Ethics statement
All procedures were cleared by the ethical review board of the
A¨rztekammer Westfalen-Lippe and subjects gave informed con-
sent to participate. All clinical investigation has been conducted
according to the principles expressed in the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Participants
The Spielberger State Trait Anxiety Inventory [70] was
completed via online survey by 310 non-clinical participants. On
the basis of individual scores, twenty-seven participants, scoring
thirty or below in the trait-anxiety inventory (range: 20–80) were
assigned to the low-anxiety group (mean trait score = 26.30,
SD=2.39; mean age 24.48, SD=5.56). Another twenty-seven
subjects scoring fifty or above were assigned to the high-anxiety
group (mean trait score = 57.59, SD=4.76; mean age 25.41,
SD=5.69). Both groups consisted of six males and twenty-one
females and were matched for age and years of schooling. All
participants were native speakers of German, right-handed (as
assessed by the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971))
and did not exhibit current axis I disorders as diagnosed by the
Mini-International Neuropsychiatric Interview (M.I.N.I.) [71].
Materials
Sixty pseudowords (e.g., ‘‘binu’’, ‘‘muxo’’, ‘‘alep’’) served as key
materials and were presented auditorily. (The stimulus material
and the result files are available from the corresponding author).
These pseudowords were legal consonant-vowel combinations of
German, taken from Breitenstein and Knecht [56], who tested the
stimuli for emotional neutrality and low similarity to existing
German words. The material was recorded and pre-edited with
use of audacity 1.2.6. software. Recorded stimuli were edited, cut
out and converted into single wave files with PRAAT software
package. The average duration of the pseudowords was 773 ms
(Min. = 578 ms, Max. = 894 ms, SD=68 ms) The selected sixty
pseudowords were randomly assigned to sixty pictures depicting
concrete objects. Half displayed neutral objects such as a bucket or
a fence, and the other half showed arousing-negative objects such
as a gun or a wound. Pictures were color photos taken from
Hemera software, Wikipedia Commons (http://commons.
wikimedia.org) and from the International Affective Picture
System [72]. Some pictures were cropped to ensure that only
one object was visible and positioned in the centre.
A pre-test was carried out to ensure neutral or arousing-negative
appraisal of the pictures. Thirty participants (psychology students
from the University of Mu¨nster) were presented with 100 pictures
(50 subjectively judged to be negative and arousing, 50 judged
neutral, non-arousing). Subjects rated valence and arousal of all
pictures via Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM)-scales [73]. Scaling
ranged from one (very pleasant or low arousal) to nine (very
unpleasant or high arousal). The thirty most negatively rated
pictures differed significantly from the thirty most neutrally rated
pictures (valence: t (49) = 15.127, p,.001; arousal: t (49) = 16.176,
p,.001). Accordingly, these thirty arousing-negative pictures were
rated more negative and more arousing (valence: MEAN=6.84,
SD=0.88; arousal: MEAN=6.59, SD=0.66) than the final thirty
neutral non-arousing pictures (valence: MEAN=4.53, SD= .92;
arousal: 4.35, SD=0.81). These sixty pictures served as materials
in the main experiment. According to the German version of
CELEX-Database [74], the word frequency of names for the
depicted objects did not differ between arousing-negative and
neutral concepts, t (49) =2.366, p= .716. Note that participants
who performed the pre-test rating did not take part in the main
experiment.
Procedure
During learning (called training in the following), the subject’s
task was to decide intuitively by button-press whether a spoken
pseudoword and a visually presented object (color picture)
matched, and were invited to guess. Participants were not
informed about the upcoming recall and valence tests and
received no feedback on their responses during training. The
training consisted of five learning passes. During each learning
pass, participants were confronted with one matching ‘‘correct’’
and one mismatching ‘‘incorrect’’ pseudoword-picture pair,
separated by at least one other pair. Hence, at the end of learning
pass five, participants had heard each pseudoword ten times, five
times paired correctly (the same pseudoword-object combination)
and five times paired incorrectly (the pseudoword paired with five
different other objects that were pseudo-randomly chosen). Note
that all pseudowords used in ‘‘incorrect’’ pairing were ‘‘correctly’’
paired with other pictures. Thus, all presented pseudowords could
be associated with meaning, and all pseudowords and pictures
appeared equally often. There were 120 pseudoword-picture pairs
per learning pass (thirty correct arousing-negative, thirty correct
neutral, thirty incorrect arousing-negative, thirty incorrect neu-
tral), and a total of 600 pairs per training. A single learning pass
lasted approximately nine minutes. The entire training lasted
about fifty minutes with a pause of five minutes after the first half
of the third learning pass. All trials began with a fixation cross,
positioned in the centre of the screen (500 ms) Next, a pseudoword
was presented via loudspeakers (<700 ms). Another fixation cross
(300 ms) and a picture (1000 ms) followed. A red exclamation
mark (2500 ms) ended the trial, providing sufficient time for the
subjects to decide whether pseudoword and pictured object
matched. If no answer was given, the trial ended after this
2500 ms interval, and the next trial was initiated. If a button was
pressed within the 2500 ms interval, the next trial began
immediately.
The explicit outcome of the training was assessed via cued
recall. Subjects were presented with the pseudowords in written
format (cues) and were asked to write down the corresponding
German word (comparable with a translation or vocabulary test).
A pseudoword-valence rating served as an assessment of the
transfer of valence from objects to pseudowords, and served as a
measurement of access to the concept’s valence by means of the
paired pseudoword. Subjects were asked to spontaneously and
intuitively rate the pseudowords in terms of valence. Scaling
ranged from minus five (very negative) to five (very positive), with
zero marked as neutral.
Design and data analyses
Participants were tested before, immediately after, and two
weeks after training. Before training, subjects completed the first
valence rating of all 60 pseudowords, immediately followed by the
training. After training, the second valence rating and the first
cued-recall (translation) test were administered. Two weeks later,
participants were confronted with the third valence rating and the
second cued-recall test. This second session was carried out online
(http://www.limesurvey.org/). All assessments on the first day
took place in the Institute for Biomagnetism and Biosignalanalysis,
affiliated to the Faculty of Medicine (Mu¨nster University). On day
one, participants received written instructions but were not
informed about the fact that their memory for the pseudowords
would be tested.
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Performance during the training, valence rating of pseudowords
and responses of the cued-recall test were analyzed by mixed
design ANOVAs with repeated measures. In all three analyses, the
transfer of valence of the correctly paired object to the pseudo-
word, labeled pseudoword affect (arousing-negatively linked, neutrally
linked) served as a within factor, and trait anxiety (high vs. low)
served as a between factor. There was an additional within-factor
in each ANOVA, varying between tests, which will be described
with each analysis.
During training. For analysis of performance during-train-
ing, the sensitivity index d’ was calculated from hits, correct
rejections, misses and false alarms [75]. The additional variable in
this analysis was learning pass (1–5). A 2 (pseudoword affect) 6 5
(learning pass)62 (trait anxiety) design was employed. The ANOVA
and post-hoc t-tests tested the effectiveness of the training, effects
of valence, and potential group differences during the learning of
the pseudowords (acquisition bias).
Cued Recall Test. Answers in the cued-recall test (translation
of pseudowords into German) were treated as correct if they
described the intended object (e.g., sofa), were synonyms (e.g.,
couch), or subordinate-category responses that were correct
descriptions of the depicted object (e.g., chesterfield). Responses
were regarded incorrect if they described the superordinate
category (e.g., furniture), semantically related objects (e.g.,
armchair) or unrelated objects (e.g., scissors). Incorrect answers
and misses (no answer given) were excluded from further analyses.
The mean of correctly translated pseudowords was subjected to an
ANOVA with the factor session as an additional factor, with two
levels (immediately after, two weeks after). This resulted in a 2
(pseudoword affect) 6 2 (session) 6 2 (trait anxiety) mixed within/
between design.
Valence Rating. For analysis of the pseudoword valence
ratings, the additional factor was session, with three levels (before
training, immediately after, and two weeks after training). Mean
valence ratings were calculated for arousing-negatively and
neutrally linked pseudowords. With a 2 (pseudoword affect) 6 3
(session) 6 2 (trait anxiety) mixed within/between design, the
development of valence ratings was investigated over time, for
arousing-negatively and neutrally linked pseudowords in both
anxiety groups.
To assess implicit effects of pseudoword affect, for those
pseudowords that were not explicitly remembered, an additional
repeated-measures ANOVA with the same design was performed
on the valence data, after removing all explicitly remembered
stimuli for each participant individually. Since the first valence
rating took place before training (thus, before any explicit
learning), all sixty items (30 paired arousing-negative, 30 paired
neutral) entered the analysis at this time point in all cases. For the
second (directly after training) and third (two weeks after training)
session, the following number of items entered the analysis: High
trait anxious persons, directly after training, arousing-negative
words: MEAN=23.8, SD=5.0, range= 11–30; neutral words:
MEAN=24.81, SD=4.7, range = 13–30; two weeks after train-
ing, arousing-negative words: MEAN=26.9, SD=2.8,
range = 19–30; neutral words: MEAN=28.7, SD=1.9,
range = 21–30. Low trait anxious persons, directly after training,
arousing-negative words: MEAN=23.8, SD=4.4, range= 16–30;
neutral words: MEAN=24.1, SD=4.0, range= 15–30; two weeks
after training, arousing-negative words: MEAN=28.3, SD=2.0,
range = 24–30; neutral words: MEAN=28.5, SD=1.2,
range = 26–30.
Results
Performance during learning
During training, accuracy rates (hits and correct rejections)
continuously increased, while false alarms and misses continuously
decreased (see figure 1). The ability to differentiate between
correct and incorrect stimulus pairs increased from an average
guessing rate of about fifty percent (beginning of training) to about
seventy percent (end of training). This was confirmed by statistical
analyses (note that the statistical calculations were done on d’
values, while the figure shows accuracy rates in percent). There
was a significant main effect for learning pass, F (4, 208) = 80.477;
p,.001, best described as a linear F (1, 52) = 106.024; p,.001 and
a quadratic trend F (1, 52) = 4.975; p,.030, which provided
evidence for the general effectiveness of the training. However,
there were no main effects for pseudoword affect or trait anxiety.
Moreover, there were no significant interaction effects, except for
pseudoword affect by learning pass, F (4, 208) = 3.875; p= .005. There
was no difference between arousing-negative and neutral affect on
learning passes 1, t (53) = 1.098; p= .277 and learning pass 5, t
(53) = 1.405; p= .166 There were insignificant trends in learning
pass 2, t (53) = 1.701; p= .095, and 4, t (53) =21.847; p= .070. A
significant difference emerged only in learning pass 3, t
(53) = 2.285; p= .026, with better learning for arousing-negatively
linked than for neutrally linked pseudowords. In all, there was little
evidence for an immediate overall acquisition bias for arousing-
negatively linked pseudowords, and no immediate acquisition
differences between high- and low-anxiety subjects.
Cued Recall
Figure 2A displays the recall rates (correct translation)
immediately after learning and two weeks later, for both
participant groups and pseudoword types. Note that performance
is displayed in percentage correct, while statistical analyses were
done on absolute values. Overall, arousing-negatively linked
pseudowords were recalled significantly more often than neutrally
linked ones, which is reflected in a main effect for pseudoword affect,
F (1, 52) = 8.787; p= .005. Also, recall rates were higher
immediately after training than two weeks after training, as
evident from the main effect of session F (1, 52) = 89.760; p,.001.
Moreover, the predicted interaction between pseudoword affect and
trait anxiety also reached significance F (1, 52) = 4.687; p= .035. As
hypothesized, high-anxiety subjects recalled significantly more
arousing-negatively linked pseudowords than neutrally linked ones
t (26) = 3.123; p= .004. This explicit memory bias is not seen in the
low-anxiety group t (26) = 0.700; p= .490. No other main effects or
interactions reached significance.
Pseudoword Valence Rating
Figure 2B displays the mean valence ratings separately for
participant groups and pseudoword affects in three sessions. The
ANOVA with session (before, immediately after and two weeks
after training), pseudoword affect, and trait anxiety showed a main
effect of pseudoword affect, F (1, 52) = 34.534; p,.001. Overall,
subjects rated arousing-negatively associated pseudowords more
negative than neutrally linked pseudowords. The rating behavior
changed significantly over time, indicated by a main effect for
factor session F (2, 104) = 11.030; p,.001, best described as a linear
trend, F (1, 52) = 18.920; p,.001. The interaction between these
two factors was also significant F (2, 104) = 28.697; p,.001. Before
training, participants did not differentiate between pseudoword
affects (arousing-negatively versus neutrally linked pseudowords), t
(53) = 0.206; p=0.837, confirming that pseudowords were equally
neutral prior to learning. However, immediately after learning t
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(53) = 7.071; p,.001, and two weeks after learning t (53) = 4.024;
p,.001, participants rated arousing-negatively linked pseudo-
words significantly more negative than neutrally linked pseudo-
words. There was a main effect for trait anxiety F (1, 52) = 7.153;
p= .010, indicating that subjects with high levels of anxiety gave
generally more negative ratings than low-anxiety persons. The
group ratings were contrasted to a neutral value. Prior to training,
low anxious participants rated the pseudowords as more positive
than this baseline (MEAN= .222; SD= .428; t (26) = 2.696;
p= .012). Immediately after learning (MEAN=2.092;
SD= .544; t (26) = 2.884; p= .385) and two weeks later
(MEAN=2.012; SD= .470; t (26) = 2.136; p= .893) ratings did
not differ from baseline. Before the training, ratings of the high
anxious persons did not differ from baseline (MEAN=2.064;
SD= .667; t (26) = 2.501; p= .621). Immediately after learning
(MEAN=2.341; SD= .739; t (26) = 22.400; p= .024) and two
weeks later (MEAN=2.487; SD= .485; t (26) = 25.219; p,
.001), ratings were negative and differed significantly from
baseline.
The interactions trait anxiety 6 session, trait anxiety 6 pseudoword
affect and trait anxiety 6 session 6 pseudoword affect did not reach
significance. Importantly, the analysis of items that were not
explicitly remembered showed identical results. All significant
main effects and interactions remained (session, F (2,52) = 10.740;
p,.001; pseudoword affect, F (1,52) = 6.985; p= .011; anxiety, F
(1,52) = 6.402; p= .014; session by pseudoword affect, F (2,
104) = 4.012; p= .021). No other interaction reached significance.
(Note: An ANOVA on the same valence data where ratings of the
first session were subtracted from ratings given at the second and
third session (baseline correction) yielded qualitatively the same
results).
Discussion
We monitored the development of a memory bias for arousing-
negative pseudowords during and after learning in high and low
trait-anxious individuals. The results demonstrate that no more
than five learning instances in an associative statistical word-
learning paradigm result in a memory bias for arousing-negatively
linked pseudowords, in comparison to neutral pseudowords. This
bias became evident in a cued-recall test immediately after
training, as well as two weeks later. Valence ratings were more
Figure 1. Accuracy (hits and correct rejections) during the word-learning training. The ability to differentiate between correct and
incorrect pseudoword-picture pairs increased as a linear trend from a guessing rate of about fifty percent (beginning of training) to about seventy
percent (end of training). Shown are averaged responses for arousing-negative and neutral pseudowords for high-anxiety subjects (upper row) and
low-anxiety subjects (lower row). Pseudowords with a to-be-learned negative connotation are shown in grey; neutrally linked pseudowords are
presented in white. Error bars represent one standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098339.g001
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negative for arousing-negatively paired pseudowords at both time
points. The bias was even present for stimuli that could not be
explicitly remembered. Persons with high levels of anxiety
displayed a strong memory bias in the cued-recall test. Moreover,
they generally rated all pseudowords as more negative than low-
anxiety persons. We discuss each of these aspects in turn.
As expected, only five correct and five incorrect pairings in an
associative learning paradigm resulted in a memory bias for
pseudowords that were paired with arousing-negative content.
This once more evidences the high effectiveness of this paradigm
for word learning, and its long-lasting effects [59,60]. Counter to
our expectation, the bias did not continuously increase during
learning, but was in a transient manner only present in the third of
five learning passes. In learning pass two (the first repetition of the
to-be-learned material) there was only a trend that did not reach
significance. At the end of the training the bias had vanished
completely. It is tempting to conclude that the bias was present
when contingency awareness between novel pseudowords and
corresponding concepts was not (yet) present. Research on implicit
learning showed that insight into underlying rules often appears
suddenly, after participants already adapted to the contingencies,
that is, after the emergence of implicit memory effects [76].
However, because there is no guarantee that the contingencies
were implicit, either initially or throughout the learning session,
the conclusion that an implicit memory bias is present only during
rather initial stages of learning (i.e. the second repetition of
stimulus material) should be treated with caution.
Immediately after learning and two-weeks later, a memory bias
became apparent in the cued-recall task. Participants were able to
‘‘translate’’ more learned pseudowords to German when these had
been paired with negative concepts. This nicely replicates earlier
findings for an explicit memory bias for emotional stimuli (e.g.
[26]), but as shown here after a very brief learning history. Though
the tasks during learning and for the cued recall differ in several
aspects, it is still surprising that one exhibits a clear memory bias
(‘‘translate’’) and the other does not (‘‘do they belong together?’’).
According to an influential model [77,78], emotion effects are
more likely to show up if rather coarse processing is at stake
(provided by a subcortical route via the amygdalae) than with
highly elaborate processing (provided by cortical structures). Given
that the translation task is more demanding and more elaborate,
this is a surprising result that begs an explanation. One line of
reasoning goes as follows. Scott and colleagues [8] argued that
valence features are part of the semantic representation of words.
In line with this argument, we assume that the activation of such
features is required in the translation task, where a one-to-one
mapping of pseudoword to an existing German word is required.
An elaborate activation of these features is not necessary in the
matching task used during learning where only a rough, coarse
match suffices for a correct response. This might explain why
implicit effects are harder to find than explicit ones [26], at least
for words.
However, the valence ratings did reveal differences between
pseudowords that were paired with arousing-negative or neutral
content, both immediately after learning and two weeks later.
Because this bias remained even when explicitly remembered
items were removed from the analysis, it rather seems to reflect
implicit memory. Following our argumentation above, valence
ratings must not necessarily activate elaborate associations, even
when explicit recall fails. This might also explain why mere
recognition of items as an explicit task failed to demonstrate a
memory bias [26]. The activation of only a few associations might
suffice for successful task completion.
Turning to differences as a function of trait anxiety, the memory
bias was present in the high trait-anxiety group but not in the low
trait-anxiety group. As for all participants, and as previously
reported [54,25], the bias differences between groups depended on
the type of measurement used. In accordance with the outcome of
Figure 2. Percentage of correct responses in the cued recall test (A) and valence ratings of pseudowords (B) displayed for sessions
and both high-anxiety (upper row) and low-anxiety subjects (lower row). Pseudowords with to-be-learned arousing-negative connotation
are shown in grey; neutrally linked pseudowords are presented in white. Error bars represents one standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0098339.g002
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the meta-study by Mitte [26], group differences were readily
detectable in the explicit cued-recall test, where the predicted
interaction emerged between anxiety group and pseudoword
affect, with only the high-anxious participants recalling more
negative than neutral words. This supports earlier findings for a
memory bias for stimuli with emotional content in high-anxious
individuals. For example, trait-anxious individuals and people with
generalized anxiety disorder remembered more threat words than
controls [25,24]. Dowens and Calvo [79] report the same, but
given that some of the reported threat words had not been
presented previously, the authors concluded that the effect was due
to a general response bias instead of a genuine memory bias. This
is similar for the main effect of trait anxiety exhibited in our own
valence ratings. Compared to persons with low anxiety levels,
persons with high anxiety levels gave more negative ratings across
all time points of measurement - even before learning. To explore
this observation in more detail, we contrasted the group ratings to
a neutral value, as baseline. Prior to training, low anxious
participants rated the pseudowords as more positive than this
baseline. Immediately after learning and two weeks later, ratings
became neutral/slightly negative. High-anxious individuals
showed a similar time course (reflected in a main effect) but their
ratings were more negative overall. High-anxious participants
started with neutral ratings before training. Their second and their
final ratings however, were clearly negative. This was true even
when explicitly recalled items were excluded. It thus appears that
before any experience was made and with increasing experience,
items are generally considered as more negative and all memories
connected to the experimental context were somehow consolidat-
ed and stored as arousing-negative.
We interpret both, the more negative judgment before learning
and the over-extension of negative ratings to all pseudoword
stimuli as a generalization effect, which is currently considered a
core feature of the anxiety pathology (e.g. [80,81]. For a long time,
only the hyper-reactivity to aversive stimuli, or to aversively
conditioned stimuli (CS+, after pairing with an aversive US), was
regarded as the basis of the anxiety pathology. The speculation
that generalization of fear might be equally involved in the
development of the disorder by now received support from quite a
few studies (cf. [82–84,81]). Additional support came from
neurophysiological studies. For instance, receptive fields in sensory
cortex become retuned into the direction of CS+ attributes (e.g.,
CS tone frequency). Importantly, this generalizes from neurons
that retune to the CS+ to neurons that retune to stimuli resembling
the CS+ ([85], for review see [86]), but there is a continuous
decrease in retuning as the stimulus becomes less and less similar
to the original CS+ [81,86]. Thus, while this neurophysiological
mechanism ascertains that potentially threatening stimuli are
recognized and remembered even when they appear in slightly
different form, the same mechanism might have negative
consequences in persons at risk for anxiety disorders. To
investigate such issues further, associative word learning offers
itself as a promising tool, because the homo-, or heterogeneity of
pseudowords and the corresponding emotional or neutral concepts
are under full control by the researcher.
From a methodological viewpoint, our study stresses the
importance of measurements at multiple time points before,
during and after learning, as well as the employment of different
methods to assess learning and memory.
Although some criticisms to earlier studies have been dealt with
in the current study, we should point out some limitations, and
make suggestions for future studies. First, we analyzed two extreme
groups (high- and low-anxious individuals), a design that is well
established and often applied in similar studies. However, It would
be interesting to know whether persons with moderate trait anxiety
exhibit a memory bias in our type of learning paradigm. Thus,
future studies should include a group with average trait anxiety
scores. Second, we carefully controlled individual learning
histories by applying pseudoword stimuli in our training.
However, the pictures that were used to link the formerly neutral
pseudowords with aversive and neutral content might have evoked
emotional associations of quite varying intensity in our partic-
ipants. The pictures were neither presented in the cued recall test
nor in the valence rating, so there are no data on this issue. Yet it is
likely that the acquired emotionality varied for the pseudoword
material. Stimuli that are not perceived equally frightening by all
participants provide a general and challenging problem. Even loud
tones and electric shocks, which might at first glance seem
objectively similar and free from individual leaning histories, are
perceived differently due to individually differing pain thresholds.
Third, pseudowords, when paired incorrectly, were combined with
both neutral and arousing-negative pictures, and thus with mixed
valence. The pairing in the correct condition was always with the
same picture, and thus with the same valence. Given that the
differentiation between arousing-negatively and neutrally linked
pseudowords was significant in the middle of training but
disappeared towards the end, it can be speculated that the
increasing mixture of valences in the incorrect condition caused a
confusion that diminished the initial immediate memory bias
effect. Future studies could check for this by keeping the valence of
correct and incorrect pairings constant. Fourth, we cannot be sure
that our participants did not apply an explicit memory strategy
during word learning. If this is the case, the word learning would
have been rather explicit and the learning of the pseudo words
happened via translation of the pictures to German words.
However, because we controlled for the word frequency of
German words, this does not explain the observed differences
between emotional and neutral words. We also performed the
analyses concerning valence by excluding the explicitly remem-
bered words. Because results did qualitatively not differ, we
strongly assume that the observed effects are not due to a retrieval
of corresponding German word forms. In fact we chose a short
and relatively shallow learning history in order to perform these
analyses. The brevity was intended to keep the participants from
in-depth learning of the stimulus material. Such deep learning took
place in our earlier studies [57,59,60,87] and prevented an analysis
of implicitly remembered items. A further issue that should be
addressed in future studies concerns the consolidation interval that
follows the training. We used a two-week interval to ensure that
the learned material would be thoroughly consolidated. At this
time point, we observed a generalization bias that did not reach
statistical significance but is clearly visible in the data (see fig. 2B).
To analyze the development and potential significance of this
generalization bias, future studies should apply a shorter interval,
or introduce additional time points of measurement that lie in
between. And, as a final matter, we suggest that future studies add
positive arousing stimuli and a further condition to the paradigm.
Based on the literature we followed a strict hypothesis driven
approach and thus applied only negative arousing and neutral
stimuli. However, including a condition with positive words could
clarify if persons with high levels of anxiety perform as controls for
such material or worse.
In sum, our data demonstrates that only few learning instances
evoke a memory bias for pseudowords paired with arousing-
negative meaning. This bias is evident in explicit and implicit tests
of memory, and is more strongly expressed in persons with high
levels of anxiety. The learning paradigm with its associations
between emotional content and neutral linguistic stimuli goes
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beyond classical, operant and evaluative conditioning paradigms
mainly used so far in emotion research. It allows monitoring the
development of a memory bias during learning, and how it evolves
after learning. As such, we consider the paradigm highly suitable
for the investigation of affective disorders and how they come into
existence.
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